Untangling the Tribal Divide: Assessing Public Support for an Inclusive Israeli Society

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Abstract

This article examines support for an inclusive society among Israel's four "tribes": Secular, religious, ultra-orthodox, and Arab. We do so using a public opinion survey that asked respondents about their support for a vision of an inclusive Israeli society and whether they believe it is feasible to implement such a vision. To assess the determinants of support, we estimate a series of multivariate models of the effect of demographic and political factors. We find that support for an inclusive Israeli society and confidence in its implementation are positively associated with level of education and political orientation, and negatively associated with the strength of religious beliefs. Given the role of religion and education, we discuss how a "startup nation for all" policy can be advanced to overcome existing barriers in creating an inclusive society.

In a well-known speech, then president of Israel, Mr. Reuven Rivlin, presented a "new Israeli order" (Rivlin, 2015). According to President Rivlin, Israel is no longer comprised of a secular Jewish majority and several minority "tribes." Instead, it is undergoing a demographic transformation in which the four major tribes—the secular, religious, ultra-orthodox and Arab—are becoming more equal in size. Thus, "the structure of the Israeli society is changing in front of us," claimed the president. These developments, the president stated, will reshape the identity of Israelis and will deeply affect the way Israelis understand themselves and their national identity.

President Rivlin offered a vision of Israel as an "Inclusive Israeli society." This vision is based on rights and responsibilities: Group rights, equity and equality must be ensured for every citizen and tribe, yet all tribes must participate in the national effort, accepting their responsibility for the nation's future. The president called for creating a shared Israeli vision, that will celebrate the cultural richness deriving from the "new Israeli order" (Rivlin, 2015).

The speech, commonly known as the "Four Tribes" speech, quickly entered the public and political discourse and has generated academic interest in the accuracy of this interpretation of Israeli society and the extent to which the public agrees with a vision of an inclusive Israeli society. Putting aside the controversial division of the Israeli society into four tribes the President identified, we ask whether there is support for an inclusive Israeli society among the general public and among each of the four proposed groups, or tribes. To what extent does the Israeli public support the vision of an inclusive society and believe in its feasibility? What are the demographic and political determinants of that support/opposition? Understanding public support and its limits are necessary elements for designing and implementing a new social order that would bridge existing barriers in Israeli society and will generate an inclusive, safe and more equal community that is shared by members of the four tribes in Israel. Despite the rich work on

social divides in Israel, attitudes about bridging gaps have so far defied empirical testing (but see Elisha 2016). In this article, we fill in this gap in existing literature using a unique public opinion survey that asked Israelis whether they support the idea of an inclusive Israeli society and whether they have confidence in implementing this vision in contemporary Israel.

We develop our argument in six parts. First, we present empirical evidence of a social divide in Israel. Second, we discuss existing approaches to addressing a social divide. Third, we lay out our theoretical model of the factors that affect support for a vision of an inclusive society and its feasibility. Fourth, we describe our models, and fifth, the findings from our empirical testing. We conclude with a discussion of a start up nation as a mechanism for implementing the vision.

Evidence of a Social Divide in Israel

The Israeli society is divided along ethnic and religious lines, which generate strong public resentments that make it difficult to achieve an inclusive social order. The primary divide is the one between the Arab minority (about 20%) and Jewish majority (about 75%).[1] Both groups have reservations about each other. According to the "Index of Arab – Jewish Relations" (2013) 29% of Israeli-Arabs are unwilling to have Jewish neighbors, and 22% believe that it is impossible to trust most Jews. Israeli-Arabs are further divided over their national identity: 30% identified themselves as Israelis, 31% as Palestinians, 7% as both, and 33% as neither (Radai et al, 2015). With regards to their relationship with the state, 64% of Israeli-Arabs feel that there is

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[1] In this paper we refer only to Arab Israelis, that is, Arabs living in Israel and having full Israeli citizenship. Our study does not deal with or refer to Arabs living outside the 1967 borders (within the Palestinian Authority).

institutional discrimination against them. Only 41% support the fulfillment of some kind of duty in service of the state in order to be treated with equality and dignity by the state (Smooha, 2013). And a majority (64%) of Israeli-Arabs have faith in the idea that Israel can be a democracy and a Jewish state at the same time (Pew, 2015).

The views of Jews toward Arabs are equally suspicious. Judaism in Israel is increasingly particularistic and ethnocentric, a trend that is especially evident among religious Jews. Religious groups are more likely to hold an opinion that does not respect the rights of the Israeli-Arabs, and are willing to accept the residence and citizenship of non-Jews in Israel as long as they do not influence the, primarily Jewish, public life in Israel (Liebman 1994). This view is supported by rich empirical data. A Pew study (2015) asked Israeli-Jews if they agree that Israeli Arabs should be exiled or moved from Israel. Support is low, but differences between religious groups are striking: 71% of ultra-religious support this view, compared to 59% of religious and 36% of seculars. A survey by the Israeli Democracy Institute (2016) reveals that 84% of seculars think Jews and Arabs should have the same rights, whereas 61% of national religious and only 40% of ultra-orthodox Jews think the same. Similar results were found when asked about increasing the budgeting for Arab and Jewish cities and for developing Arab heritage and culture. The three religious groups also differ in the extent to which they recognize that there is discrimination against Israeli-Arabs: The more religious a participant is, the less likely he or she is to believe that such discrimination exists. 27% of ultra-orthodox Jews, 31% of national religious, and 67% of seculars agree with this statement.

The divide within the Israeli society is not limited to views between Arabs and Jews and about Israeli-Arab population. The Four Tribes speech refers to three Jewish tribes based on religious practice: Secular, religious, and ultra-orthodox. The division of Israeli society into these four

tribes is controversial, specifically when measuring and defining the religious groups. President

Rivlin's typology is based on the common factions in the Israeli education system. Rivlin

chooses to present the projected percentage of first graders in 2018 in each faction: 38% secular,

15% religious, 22% ultra-orthodox, 25% Arabs. Others promote different divisions. The Israeli

Democracy Index divides the Jewish population into five groups: Seculars, traditional non-

religious, traditional religious, ultra-orthodox and national religious (Herman et al, 2018). The

central bureau of statistics divides the Jewish population (75%) into four groups: Seculars (34%),

traditional (19%), religious (12%), and ultra-orthodox (10%). While President Rivlin's division

may appear overly simplistic, the education division has advantages: Each faction has a specific

curriculum that are likely to result in distinct graduates, which in turn affects perceptions of

citizenship, democracy and liberal values (Dewey, 1916; Lipset, 1959; Nie et al, 1996; Putnam,

2000). Consequently, President Rivlin's division provides us a useful map for assessing the

trajectory of public acceptance for his vision (Elisha 2016).

A study by the Pew Research Center (2014-2015) demonstrates that the more religious a

participant is, the more likely he will support Jewish principles for solving conflicts, prefer

Halacha (Jewish law) as the law for Jews in Israel, and oppose reform or conservative weddings

in Israel. A different study, conducted by Tamar Herman (2014), shows that religious groups are

also less willing to compromise about religious issues (on a scale of 0-1, when 1 means most

willing to compromise): Ultra-orthodox presented the lowest rates (0.12), national religious were

slightly higher (0.37) and seculars displayed the highest willingness to compromise (0.64). The

two religious groups also have a sense of moral superiority: 49% of national religious Jews and

80% of ultra-orthodox Jews believe that religious Jews have higher morals than secular Jews.

Finally, the three Jewish tribes also demonstrate significant differences in their trust in governing

institutions. Ultra-orthodox Jews demonstrate the weakest trust: parliament (15%), government (18%) and supreme court (13%). National religious Jews have a more trust in government: 50% have faith in the government and parliament, and 40% in the Supreme Court. Among seculars, the trust in government is 54%, in parliament it is 45%, and in the Supreme Court it is 76%. The differences in the notion of compromise, of group superiority, and of trust in government, strengthen the concern that religious identity will affect views about the creation of one common identity, a key component of an inclusive society.

Existing Approaches for Dealing with Multi-Ethnic Societies

Israel is not unique in facing challenges to democracy derived from a multi-ethnic cultural society. In addition to several multi-cultural and immigrant societies that have struggled with this challenge, globalization processes in the last few decades and recent influx of immigrants compelled many countries, especially European nations, to face this challenge. Four main approaches have been used to address this issue (Mintz et. al, 2017, Elisha 2016): Social cohesion, liberal indifference, multiculturalism, and multicultural citizenship. We briefly discuss each below.

Social cohesion. According to this approach, civic nationalism and social cohesion are goals far more important than recognition of group diversity. It is based on the belief held by citizens of a given nation-state that they share a moral community, which enables them to trust each other (Larsen, 2013). A prominent example of this approach is France, which banned students from wearing clothes with religious affiliation, like burqa among Muslims (Tamir, 1995).

Liberal indifference. This approach determines that the state should not favor and promote any specific nationality, culture or religion. Instead, the state should only provide personal rights, and

protect against infringements of those rights (Mintz et. al, 2017). The United States is a classic example of such approach (Kukathas, 1998).

Multiculturalism. This approach views positively ethnic-cultural diversity, and strives to include it in its society, especially in terms of economy, culture and entertainment. Multiculturalism takes these familiar cultural markers of ethnic groups and treats them as authentic practices to be preserved by their members and safely consumed by others (Kymlicka, 2012). The prominent examples of this approach are Canada and Australia, as both institutionalized it few decades ago. Sweden is the best example for multiculturalism in Europe. The economic situation in the nations implementing this approach has a crucial effect on the level of public acceptance it receives (Tamir, 1995).

Multicultural citizenship (civic integration). This approach focuses on a diversity of complex national citizenships, many identities and civil rights. Under the "structure" of one civil identity, all those different cultural / ethnic / religious identities will co-exist peacefully (Elisha, 2016, Mintz et. al, 2017). This policy advocates for political participation and creating economic opportunities over symbolic politics of cultural recognition. Human and civil rights are favored over cultural traditions. Only through integration the different group could unite around the same goals and establish social equality (Yonah, 1991). Belgium and Switzerland are the best examples of this approach.

No nation follows one of these approaches exclusively. More common is an amalgamation of elements from various approaches (Elisha, 2016). In the past few years, as many nations failed to establish societies free of discrimination and social oppression, the criticism over multiculturalism and social cohesion has increased. According to critics, these countries contributed to the disintegration of western societies, such as Sweden, Germany, Netherlands

and Canada. The attempts to incorporate cultural differences intensified ethnic divisions and weakened their solidarity. The opposite approach of 'national cohesion' does not prevail either. France faces a substantial Muslim minority that did not integrate completely. The integrative approach yielded the best results, as seen in Switzerland, which created the best economic opportunities and some social capital.

Other nations (such as Spain) combine multiculturalism and social cohesion, implementing the first toward veteran national minorities (e.g. Catalonians and Basques), and the latter toward new immigrants (e.g. Moroccans) (Mintz et. al, 2017). Consequently, the classical multicultural discourse was then changed into social integration, in which cultural and ethnic diversity is accepted under one common civil identity. This new approach strives to overcome the obstacles presented by the naivete of multiculturalism, while refraining from deterioration to pre-WWII extreme nationalistic ideologies. President's Rivlin initiative for an inclusive Israeli society resembles this approach, as it calls for preserving the identities of all tribes while creating a joined civil identity.

Theory

What factors affect support for an inclusive society? We expect that the four tribes will demonstrate statistically significant differences in a) their support for an inclusive Israeli society, and b) confidence in the feasibility of implementing such social order. We further expect that differences between tribes would be mitigated by education, political orientation, age and gender

First, given the strong Israeli-Arab cleavage, we expect that individuals from the Arab tribe will support the vision of an inclusive Israeli society that would see them as equal partners in the Israeli society. However, due to their low trust in the sincerity of the Jewish majority, they will

be weary of the ability of the Israeli society to implement it. Second, among the three Jewish tribes, we expect that religious identity will affect views about support for a common identity and the ability to implement it—the more religious a group is, the less likely the individuals will be for an inclusive Israeli society.

Adding to the basic divisions among the tribes, we suggest that education, political orientation, age and gender will explain support for the vision and belief in its feasibility. Starting with education, Shamir and Sullivan (1985) suggested that education is a prominent factor of political tolerance, which they describe as the willingness to activate procedural and democratic norms without connection to stances, ideas and interests. Shamir and Sullivan illustrate three ways in which education influences the level of political tolerance: massive expose to a variety of opinions, encouraging deep and flexible thought, and teaching the principle of a ' free market of ideas' as a basic democratic value. They determine that the level of education is significant explanatory variable for the political tolerance, when the biggest difference is in the difference between high school education and elementary education. Political tolerance is an indispensable factor in determining the feasibility of implementing an inclusive Israeli society.

This view is supported by the influential work of Ronald Inglehart, who shows that education leads to financial stability which in turn strengthens support for democratic values. Inglehart emphasizes the importance of education in shaping democratic morality, which stands at the basis of an inclusive Israeli society (Inglehart, 1999).

Evidence of an association between age and gender and support for an inclusive society is more contested. Shamir and Sullivan claim that socio-demographic variables, such as age and gender, are not significant predictors of the level of political tolerance (Shamir & Sullivan, 1985). The Pew study mentioned above provides a similar conclusion: age and gender do not determine

support for Jewish values over democratic values (Pew, 2015).

On the other hand, Herman found an association between age and religious tolerance. With regards to religious issues, younger cohorts report lower willingness to compromise in all Jewish tribes: 18 – 24 (0.32), 25 – 34 (0.38), 35 – 54 (0.41), 55+ (0.43) (Herman, 2014). We therefore expect that age will be positively associated with support for an inclusive Israeli society, across tribes: Older cohorts will be more supportive than younger cohorts.

We further expect that gender differences will play a role. The effect of gender on political views in Israel draws much scientific research and the call is out for a clear view about the direction of that effect. Yet, recent work on views of out-groups (in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) suggest that women are more supportive of politically motivated social distancing and exclusion of out-groups compared to men (Ben Shitrit et. al, 2017). We therefore cautiously suggest that women will be less supportive of an inclusive Israeli society.

Finally, we claim that support for an inclusive Israeli society is associated with political orientation. An inclusive society is derived from views of multiculturalism, which is based on the notion of self-determination of minorities. It recognizes the right of groups within the national structure (Rubinstein, 2017), therefore making it compatible with liberal ideological views. In Israel, these views are strongly associated with left party orientation, especially since the 1967 Six Day War and the consequential debate about the West Bank and Gaza, which aligned liberal social views with left parties and more conservative social views with right parties (Eisenstadt, 2014; Herman, 2014; Rubinstein, 2017).

We summarize our hypotheses below:

- National Divide: Israeli Arab will be supportive of an inclusive Israeli society but be weary of its feasibility

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- Religion: Among Israeli Jews, higher level of religious views will be associated with lower levels of support for an inclusive Israeli society and its feasibility.

- Education: Higher levels of education will be associated with higher levels of support for inclusive Israeli society and its feasibility.

- Gender: Men will be more supportive of an inclusive Israeli society than women.

- Political Orientation: People identifying with the political left will be more supportive of an inclusive Israeli society and its feasibility.

Method

To test our expectations, we use a survey conducted by [the first author] in April 2016 designed to examine support for an inclusive Israeli society.[2] The survey includes 1231 participants with relatively equal shares of the four tribes defined by President Rivlin: secular (n=297), national religious (n=320), ultra-orthodox (n=311), and Arab (n=303). All participants were above the age of 18 and Hebrew speaking (blind source). The survey was administered by the Smith Research Institute, using phone and opt-in panels, adjusted to each tribe based on its unique characteristics and response patterns.

Among the numerous questions about the issue, we examine two questions about general view of an inclusive society: support for an inclusive Israeli society; and belief in the feasibility of the vision of an inclusive Israeli society for the four tribes. Figure 1 below presents the response to these two questions, divided into the four tribes.

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[2] The survey was approved by the Helsinki committee at the IDC.

Figure 1: Public Attitudes about Inclusive Israeli Society, by Tribe

The horizontal red line marks the 50% threshold. On average, the four tribes *support* an inclusive Israeli society. As hypothesized, the least supportive groups are the religious groups—religious (57%) and ultra-orthodox (60%). As expected, support for an inclusive Israeli society among Arabs is high (68%), reaching nearly similar values of those presented by the secular tribe (73%).

There is more hesitance about the belief in the feasibility of implementing this vision. On average, only four of every ten Israelis believe that such social order is feasible. The weariest tribe is the ultra-orthodox tribe, of which only a quarter believes that an inclusive Israeli society is feasible. We were encouraged by the relative confidence of the Arab tribe in this vision. Fifty-one percent of Israeli-Arabs believed it is feasible to achieve an inclusive Israeli society, a rate similar to that of the secular tribe (52%). Both, however, are equally divided over this issue—with a half optimistic and a half not.

Going beyond this descriptive, the key contribution of this paper is assessing empirically the demographic and political factors that affect support for an inclusive Israeli society—in principle and in the ability to implement such a vision. We first present overall support across demographic and political strata, and then estimate a series of multivariate regression models, examining the independent and relative effect of each demographic and political factor on the pooled population and within each tribe separately.

Our theory led us to test the effect of the explanatory variables political orientation, religious perception, age, education and gender. To measure religiosity we rely on a question in the survey asking respondents to classify themselves in terms of religious strength ranging from very religious, traditional, religious and secular. We use this classification for the three Jewish tribes.

To measure political orientation, we rely on a question in our survey about self-placement on a three-point scale—left, center and right. Israel has a multi-party system which is often divided into three main political camps—left, center and right. Given the quality difference between these political camps, we include each camp as a binary indicator. We use the Right camp as our reference category.

Age is coded into four age groups: 18-29, 30-49, 50-64, and 65 and over. These groups are commonly used to classify the Israeli population. Education is coded as an ordinal variable ranging from no high school diploma (including grade school and partial high school), high school diploma, some post-diploma education, and academic education (a bachelor degree or more). For gender, we use an indicator for male, leaving women as the reference category.

Table 1 below summarizes support for an inclusive Israeli society among each demographic group.

Table 1: Views of an Inclusive Israeli Society

	(1) Inclusive Israeli Society	(2) Feasibility
Education		
No High School Diploma	65%	44%
High School Diploma	56%	39%
Post High School Education	65%	38%
Academic Education	68%	49%
Gender		
Male	65%	45%
Female	63%	41%
Age		
18-29	58%	37%
30-49	64%	43%
50-64	69%	50%
65+	81%	54%
Political Orientation		
Left	75%	57%
Center	75%	48%
Right	53%	35%

Differences between education and gender groups are minimal and inconsistent. Age and political orientation, however, offer clear differences in support for an inclusive Israeli society and the feasibility of achieving it. It is important to note, however, that as we show below, some of the differences and similarities may be amplified or suppressed once we account for possible correlation between groups, and, especially, differences between tribes. To further test the independent effect of each variable on support for and the belief in the feasibility of an inclusive society including the four tribes, we estimate a series of binary logistic regressions that differ in the population they are applied to.

First, we estimate support for an inclusive society among the three Jewish tribes—secular, religious and ultra-orthodox—examining support for the social order and confidence in the ability to implement it. In these models we do not include a variable for tribe, but examine the effect of religiosity on views of an inclusive Israeli society (among Jews).

Second, we examine each tribe separately, applying the same model to each tribe and assessing the effect of our explanatory variables on support for an inclusive society.

Finally, we estimate support for an inclusive Israeli society and confidence in the ability to implement it on the pooled sample (including secular, religious, ultra-orthodox and Arab tribes). To account for variation between the tribes (as is illustrated in Figure 1), we estimate a mixed effects model where tribes are applied as random effects and all of our explanatory variables as fixed effects.

Findings

Our first model examines support for a) an inclusive Israeli society, and b) its feasibility among the three Jewish tribes (pooling the three together). As explanatory variables, we include religiosity, age, education, gender and political orientation.[3] This offers a direct test of the effect of religiosity and political orientation in the Israeli-Jewish population, and serves as confirmation on our classification of the three Jewish Tribes. The results are summarized in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Views of an Inclusive Israeli Society, among Israeli Jews

	(1) Inclusive Israeli Society	(2) Feasibility

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[3] Adding interaction terms between gender and political affiliation yield no significant results.

Religiosity	-0.05	-0.26***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Education	0.14$^{\wedge}$	0.25**
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Male	0.09	0.16
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age	0.08	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Political Orientation: Left	1.76***	0.86**
	(0.40)	(0.30)
Political Orientation: Center	1.03***	0.17
	(0.19)	(0.18)
Constant	-0.29	-0.80*
	(0.39)	(0.39)
Observations	853	829

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{\wedge} p < .1, ^{*} p < .05, ^{**} p < .01, ^{***} p < .001$

The results conform only with our political views hypothesis and expectation. Model 1 demonstrates that support for an inclusive Israeli society is weakly associated with education (only at a .1 level): People who are more educated are more likely to support an inclusive Israeli society. We find a strong statistical association between political orientation and support for an inclusive Israeli society: People who identify with center or left parties are more likely to support an inclusive Israeli society than people affiliated with right-wing parties (the reference category). The effect is large. In terms of odd ratios, Israeli Jews who identify themselves as Left are nearly 6 times as likely to support and inclusive Israeli society than individuals identifying themselves as Right. Israeli Jews who identify themselves politically as Center are nearly 3 times as likely to support an inclusive Israeli society than Right wing individuals. Religiosity, gender and age are not statistically significant estimators of support.

The second model estimates views of the feasibility of achieving an inclusive Israeli society among the three Jewish tribes. Two differences from this model and the support for an inclusive Israeli society model should be pointed out. First, religiosity is a significant estimator of views about the feasibility of implementing an inclusive Israeli society. As expected, the more religious an individual is, the less likely s/he has confidence that the vision of an inclusive Israeli society can work. Second, while Israeli Jews who identify with the political Left are more confident in the feasibility of such a new social order (odds ratios drop to 2.37), we find no significant difference between Israeli Jews identifying themselves with the political Center and those identifying with the political Right. The difference in the effect of political orientation between the two models is interesting. Support for an inclusive Israeli society is, as expected, weakest among Right wing voters (model 1, Right is the reference category). Confidence of implementation of this vision, is strong only among those affiliated with left parties (model 2).

While these initial results are based on the three Jewish tribes only, they offer a first important indication about the views of Israelis about an inclusive Israeli society and the ability to implement this important vision. Our main research variables: religion, political orientation and education are effective factors in explaining support for a new social structure. Gender and religion offer little estimation value.

Assessing Support for and Confidence in an Inclusive Israeli Society, by Tribe

To account for likely differences between the four political tribes in the effect of demographic and political estimators on our two dependent variables, we estimate the same model on each of the four tribes. Because of the strong orientation of tribes with religiosity, we do not include religiosity in these models. Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates of the four models estimating support for an inclusive Israeli society.

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Table 3: Support for an Inclusive Israeli Society, by Tribe

	(1) Secular	(2) Religious	(3) Ultra-Orthodox	(4) Arab
Education	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.17
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Male	-0.01	0.08	0.42	-0.19
	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.31)
Age	0.05	0.32*	-0.41^	0.20
	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Left	2.26***	-0.01	1.30	-0.14
	(0.57)	(0.95)	(0.82)	(0.91)
Center	0.95**	1.44**	0.99**	0.08
	(0.31)	(0.51)	(0.31)	(0.90)
Constant	-0.24	-1.13*	0.12	0.13
	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.48)	(1.00)
Observations	274	299	280	218

Standard errors in parentheses. $^\wedge p < .1$, $^* p < .05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$

The results reveal the variation in the patterns of support for an inclusive Israeli society among the four tribes. First, among the Jewish tribes, the only consistent factor is again political orientation—Israeli Jews, across tribes, who identify politically as Left, are more likely to support an inclusive Israeli society. Among seculars, we find that a Left political orientation is also associated with support for this social order. Among the two religious tribes, left political orientation is a minority orientation, and hence differences are not likely to be statistically significant.

Education and gender have no significant effect on support for an inclusive Israeli society, but age plays an interesting role. Support for an inclusive Israeli society among the secular tribe is not associated with age groups. But, among the two religious groups we find opposing generational differences: Age (categories) is positively correlated with support for an inclusive

Israeli society among the national religious tribe whereas it is inversely correlated among the ultra-orthodox tribe. This is consistent with general trends about these two tribes—national religious going through a process of greater segregation (Herman 2014), whereas young cohorts of ultra-orthodox are increasingly seeking assimilation (Malach 2018).

The null findings regarding the Arab tribe suggest that the relatively high support for an inclusive Israeli society among this tribe is not shared or led by specific demographic or political sector.

Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates of belief in the feasibility of implementing the vision.

Table 4: Belief in Feasibility of an Inclusive Israeli Society, by Tribe

	(1) Secular	(2) Religious	(3) Ultra-Orthodox	(4) Arab
Education	0.15	0.27*	0.31*	0.03
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Male	-0.29	0.18	0.81*	-0.25
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.29)
Age	0.03	0.08	-0.18	-0.23
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Left	0.93*	0.50	1.46*	-0.81
	(0.38)	(0.94)	(0.67)	(0.91)
Center	0.00	0.93*	0.38	-0.71
	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.90)
Constant	-0.47	-1.45**	-2.26***	1.45
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.57)	(1.00)
Observations	261	296	272	218

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Political orientation is once again and convincingly a significant predictor of support for this vision. Respondents identifying with left (among seculars and ultra-orthodox) or center views

(among religious) are more likely to have confidence in the ability to implement this social order. In addition, education is an informative predictor of belief in the feasibility of an inclusive Israeli society—among the religious and ultra-orthodox tribes, but not among the secular and Arab tribes. This suggests that, for these tribes, education can improve an enhanced and unified community in Israel.

The contrast in the effect of education on the feasibility of implementation (Table 3) compared to the lack of significant effect on support for an inclusive Israeli society (Table 2) is an important matter, especially given the relatively high support rates for an inclusive Israeli society. Israelis, to great extent, want an inclusive Israeli society. There is some variation between the parties, but the overall sentiment is of relative support. Stronger differences are about implementation. It is there that we see that education can play a role in bridging gaps and implementing change.

The national religious tribe is considered to be homogenous, as its members are mostly affiliated with the right wing and the settlement movement (Herman, 2014). Consequently, the findings deriving from this tribe regarding the positive correlation between education and support for an inclusive Israeli society are encouraging. As the members of this tribe become ever more involved in the public and economic affairs, they will participate more in the higher education system and exposed to the values which the vision of an inclusive Israeli society is based upon more than ever before. This, may be conditioned on the education system and may require one that would advance inclusion rather than maintain exclusionary, separated education and divisive discourse.

Assessing Support for and Confidence in an Inclusive Israeli Society, among all Israelis

Finally, we estimate overall support for an inclusive society by pooling the four Israeli tribes together (Secular, Religious, Ultra-Orthodox, Arab). To account for differences between tribes, we estimate two multilevel mixed effects models where our political and demographic factors are treated as fixed effects and the tribes as random—thus allowing differences between the tribes in the relative effect of the demographic and political factors. The results are summarized in Table 5 below.

Table 5: Mixed Effect Model of Pooled Sample of Inclusive Israeli Society

	(1) Inclusive Israeli Society	(2) Belief in Feasibility
Education	0.19**	0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Male	0.06	0.08
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Age	0.10	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Left	1.00***	0.75***
	(0.20)	(0.23)
Center	0.99***	0.48**
	(0.16)	(0.17)
Constant	-0.63*	-1.06***
	(0.25)	(0.31)
Random Effect - Tribe		
Constant	-15.11	-1.04*
	(558848.59)	(0.41)
Observations	1071	1047

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{\wedge} p < .1,$ $^{*} p < .05,$ $^{**} p < .01,$ $^{***} p < .001$

Model 1 is support for an inclusive Israeli society. Model 2 is belief in the feasibility of this social order. The intercept of tribes is insignificant in the first model and significant in the second. This means that there is no statistical difference between the tribes in support for the vision of inclusive society of the four tribes, but there are differences in the belief about the feasibility of implementing this vision.

The fixed effects reveal the expected association of education and political orientation. Higher education levels are associated with stronger support for an inclusive society and a belief in feasibility of its implementation. Similarly, affiliation with the political left is positively associated with the two measures of support for an inclusive society.

In sum, the results support the following hypotheses: Political orientation, religion and education play an important role in determining the strength of public support for an inclusive Israeli society and its feasible implementation. Consistent with a broader debate about the effect of gender on political attitudes in Israel, gender plays no clear role in views about this issue.

Our finding regarding the significant effect of political orientation is important. It reflects key cleavages in Israeli society and the association between these cleavages and views of Israeli society. The important finding here, however, is the role played by education. Education affects the confidence in implementing an inclusive Israeli society. This is a vehicle of change in an increasingly heterogeneous society that has changed from a majority-minority group structure to a society with relatively equal size of core groups.

Discussion: The Start-Up Nation, Innovation Diffusion and Inclusiveness

Israel is often characterized as the "startup nation". Yet, the high-tech sector in Israel employs only a fraction of the Israeli work force – 297,000 out of 4 million workers (Bassok, 2017).

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There is a shortage of workers in this sector, which denies the industry from further developing. According to the Israel Innovation authority, in the next decade there will be a shortage of 10,000 engineers and programmers. As a result, while the Israeli high-tech sector is above the OECD average in terms of productivity, its success does not permeate into other Israeli sectors of industry, which are well below the average of productivity, therefore cannot fulfil its potential as the most prominent industry in Israel (The Innovation authority report, 2016).

The authority's report states that the main reason for the shortage of workers is the very high entrance bar set by the universities to the relevant majors, therefore preventing many young potential workers from receiving the required education to enter the sector. As a result, the number of qualified engineers graduating the Israeli academia every year is insufficient to meet the demand in the high-tech sector (The innovation authority, 2017).

Consequently, the IDF's technological units are the major producer of employees to the startup industry. Those units are mostly comprised of secular Jews, therefore making the high-tech sector a closed clique: 97% of high – tech workers are non-ultra-orthodox Jews, primarily male (71%). The other 3% are ultra-orthodox and Arab Israelis. Furthermore, a study found that there is a strong positive correlation between the parental economic status and level of education to their child's chances of working in the High-tech sector (Mazuz - Harpaz & Krill, 2017).

Common knowledge in Israel dictates that the nation's most promising growth engine are the Israeli-Arab and Jewish ultra-orthodox tribes. Those two tribes, comprising a significant share of the Israeli population, are underrepresented in the Israeli work force. One way to enhance inclusiveness in Israeli society is by expanding the high-tech sector to include ultra-orthodox Jews and Israeli - Arabs, so Israel can become a startup nation *for all* and not just for its Jewish secular tribe (Weiss 2016).

This is illustrated in one of the survey items. Respondents were asked whether they believe the economy is open to all tribes. The responses are summarized in Figure 2. The ultra-orthodox tribe has very little confidence in its ability to be involved in the Israeli economy.

Figure 2: Is the Economy Open to All Tribes? (by Tribe)

The ultra-orthodox tribe is trailing behind financially beyond the other Jewish groups, due to its low participation in the work force. Recent data indicate that in the first two quarters of 2017, 51% of ultra-orthodox men were working, a significant accretion from the 33% recorded in 2005, yet a decline from the year before (54%) (Margalit, 2017). They lack education that is needed to participate in the work force, and their options are narrow and most likely conclude in a minimum salary, making it ineffective for them to join the work force. Joining the high – tech sector might change this equation, as the average salary in it is three times higher than the overall average, making it much more lucrative (Sade, 2017). The ultra-orthodox tribe in Israel is

undergoing significant changes the past decade (Kalagy & Barun-Lewenshon, 2017). The findings regarding the positive correlation between education and support for an inclusive Israeli society among members of the national religious tribe offers some hope that the same process could take place in the ultra-orthodox tribe as its' members attend academic institutions with increased numbers. As a result, this tribe might demonstrate more support in an "inclusive Israeli society".

Among the Israeli-Arab tribe, the overall results are: 66% of Israeli-Arabs support an inclusive Israeli society. However, 49% of them believe in the feasibility of this program, the highest percentage of all tribes (Mintz and Elisha, 2016). To enhance inclusiveness of this tribe, the government should assist them in becoming more productive members of the Israeli economy. Specifically, the high-tech sector needs more workers; therefore, the government should open high-tech skills training centers designated for this tribe and encourage enrollment to high-tech related undergraduate degrees, as only 2400 Arab – Israelis were enrolled to those last year (Mazuz-Harpaz & Krill, 2017). In addition, it should incentivize companies to open offices in the periphery, closer to cities highly populated with Arab – Israelis, and hire them (Yashiv & Kasir, 2013). The Startup nation for all idea, if planned and implemented correctly, can lead to a more inclusive Israeli society.

Our approach calls for enhancing grassroots and inclusive innovations by incorporating the ultra-orthodox and Arab-Israeli segments of Israeli society to the high-tech, labor market. These two segments of Israeli society are not represented there yet, even though they constitute a very large percentage of Israeli society. Including these segments in the economic workforce would not only benefit the Israeli economy but will also promote an inclusive society.

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